Rainwater Harvesting and Groundwater Conservation: When Endogenous Heterogeneity Matters by Soubeyran, Raphaël et al.
HAL Id: hal-01129958
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01129958
Submitted on 16 May 2020
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Rainwater harvesting and groundwater conservation:
when endogenous heterogeneity matters
Raphael Soubeyran, Mabel Tidball, Agnes Tomini, Katrin Erdlenbruch
To cite this version:
Raphael Soubeyran, Mabel Tidball, Agnes Tomini, Katrin Erdlenbruch. Rainwater harvesting and
groundwater conservation: when endogenous heterogeneity matters. Environmental and Resource
Economics, Springer, 2015, 62 (1), pp.19-34. ￿10.1007/s10640-014-9813-9￿. ￿hal-01129958￿
Rainwater Harvesting and Groundwater Conservation:
When Endogenous Heterogeneity Matters
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Abstract
In this paper, we focus on resource conservation in a model of decentralized
management of groundwater and rainwater. We show that a conservation policy
may have opposite effects on the level of the resource, depending on the outcome
of the decentralized management. More precisely, we consider identical farmers
who can use two water resources (groundwater and/or rainwater) and we study
the symmetric and asymmetric feedback stationary Nash equilibria of the dynamic
game. We show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may increase the level of the
aquifer at the symmetric equilibrium, whereas it decreases the level of the aquifer
at the asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior)
symmetric equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications.
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1 Introduction
Water scarcity is expected to become an ever-increasing problem in the future and one of
the main issues under climate change (IPCC [7]). With the increase in the frequency of
extreme weather events, one of the key climate impacts is changing precipitation patterns,
which may challenge hydrological functioning, and disturb existing equilibria (IPCC [7]).
We can thus expect that the growing pressure on common resources will trigger further
competition among resource users, jeopardizing existing management arrangements (Os-
trom [15]). The ongoing decline in water tables encourages developing new conservation
policies and new water supplies in many places in the World. Scholars argue that pricing
schemes may help to conserve water (Johnson et al. [8]) and that rainwater harvesting
should be promoted (Pandey [16]). Rainwater harvesting is also put forward by several
international organizations’ programmes such as the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme. In several States, in Europe1 and in the U.S.,2 tax credits are offered in order
to reduce the costs of rainwater harvesting.
The present paper has two main contributions. First, whereas the literature on ground-
water management has mainly discussed the quantitative effect of a policy on users wealth
(see Koundouri [10] for a survey), we focus on the qualitative effect of a policy, that is
whether the policy results in a greater, or on the contrary a smaller, conservation level of
the groundwater resource. We consider a model of decentralized management of ground-
water and rainwater and show that a conservation policy may have opposite effects on
the level of the resource, depending on the outcome of the decentralized management. In-
centives for rainwater use can lead to an increase or a decrease in the level of the aquifer,
because of the lack of coordination as regards groundwater and rainwater use. Second,
going beyond the usual focus on symmetric (interior) equilibria in dynamic games,3 we
1In Europe’s biggest crop production area, in the center and north of France, where farmers have access
to both groundwater and rainwater resources, water taxes are differentiated such that rainwater use is
relatively less expensive than groundwater use. This policy aims at preserving groundwater resources
and is intended to be strengthened over the next couple of years, with increasing differences in tax rates
being scheduled (see 10th Programme of the Seine-Normandie Water Agency).
2See, for instance, the Texas Tax Code 152.355.
3Dockner et al. [4] argue that “one can often take advantage of symmetries. For example if the
game is completely symmetric [...] one can try to find a symmetric Nash equilibrium”. Rowat [20] uses
computational techniques to identify the Markov perfect equilibria in a two symmetric agent differential
game with bounded controls. He finds no evidence of asymmetric equilibria. However he focuses on linear
2
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characterize the stationary symmetric and asymmetric (feedback) Nash equilibria of the
dynamic game played by groundwater and rainwater users. We show that a subsidy (a
tax) on the use of rainwater may increase (decrease) the level of the aquifer at a symmetric
equilibrium, whereas the subsidy (the tax) may decrease (increase) the level of the aquifer
at an asymmetric equilibrium. This suggests that the usual focus on (interior) symmetric
equilibria in dynamic games may provide misleading policy implications.
In our model, we deal with the interactions between identical farmers who can choose
between two water supplies (groundwater or rainwater). First, groundwater and rainwater
have different productive properties: evaporation of rainwater may be greater than that of
groundwater, and the consumption of groundwater may consequently be higher; ground-
water may be salty or contain toxic substances (e.g. chloride, nitrates, pesticides) leading
to higher consumption of rainwater. Second, groundwater and rainwater are interdepen-
dent, because the collection of rainwater reduces the amount of water that replenishes
the aquifer. An interesting property of this game is that the farmers who collect rainwa-
ter escape the pumping cost externality, but they generate a negative externality for the
farmers who pump groundwater: they reduce the amount of water that can replenish the
aquifer which, in turn, increases the pumping cost.
This paper builds on the literature on water resource economics (see for example
Cummings [3], Gisser and Sanchez [6], Moreaux and Reynaud [12],[13], Negri [14], Roseta-
Palma [18], Rubio and Casino [21]). In particular, our paper is linked to the literature that
considers water as a system of different water bodies. One strand of the literature deals
with optimal management of multiple groundwater resources (see Roumasset and Wada
[19] or Zeitouni and Dinar [26]). Another strand studies the conjunctive use of ground and
surface water (see Burt [1], Chakravorty and Umetsu [2], Gemma and Tsur [5], Knapp
and Olson [9], Krulce, Roumasset and Wilon [11], Pongkijvorasin and Roumasset [17],
Stahn and Tomini [23], [24] or Tsur and Graham-Tomasi [25]). Roumasset and Wada [19]
showed that optimal management of several independent groundwater resources depend on
their marginal opportunity cost: only the resource with the lowest marginal opportunity
cost is used initially, whereas in the steady state, all resources are used. However, in the
present paper, we consider two interrelated resources. Hence, we cannot simply compare
quadratic differential games and interior solutions.
3
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marginal extraction and user costs of separate use, but we compare conjunctive and
separate use of groundwater and rainwater. Zeitouni and Dinar [26] studied the case of
two interrelated aquifers : depending on the relative height of the water tables, water will
flow from one aquifer to the other. This could lead to the contamination of the aquifer
with the better water quality. Optimal water management is then defined by the joint
management of these interrelated resources, the threat of contamination representing an
additional externality that has to be taken into account. In the present paper, we do not
deal with two interrelated aquifers but instead with the interaction between rainwater
and groundwater resources. Rainwater and groundwater are physically linked because
rainwater (partially) infiltrates the soil and replenishes the aquifer. Stahn and Tomini
([23], [24]) also considered the joint use of groundwater and rainwater and focused on
the optimal management of these resources. They showed that, in the long-run, the
introduction of rainwater harvesting may lead to a greater depletion of the groundwater
aquifer. This result was obtained by extending the standard groundwater model to include
the connection between two water supplies. Especially, in [23], the decrease in the water
table first occurs because of the negative effect of rainwater harvesting on the groundwater
recharge rate and, second, because the efficiency of water use depends on the relative rate
of evapotranspiration in the storage reservoir and infiltration to the groundwater aquifer.
In the present paper, we consider groundwater and rainwater uses but, in contrast to
Stahn and Tomini ([23], [24]), we focus on interactions between several farmers. In this
context, the literature has shown that the cost-externality and the strategic externality
have to be taken into account when regulatory policies are designed (see Negri [14] and
Rubio and Casino [21]). We build on this fact and highlight the qualitative effect that a
conservation policy may have.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In section 3,
we describe the necessary conditions required for the existence of stationary symmetric
and asymmetric feedback Nash equilibria, emphasizing the interactions between the two
water sources. In section 4, we discuss the impact of water-pricing policies (tax/subsidy)
on the rainwater and groundwater extraction policies in the symmetric and asymmetric
feedback Nash equilibria. Finally, in section 5, we draw some conclusions.
4
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2 The Model
We consider a continuous time strategic interaction problem where a fixed number N ≥ 2
of farmers uses water as an input and can use rainwater and/or groundwater.
2.1 Groundwater Dynamics
We consider a single aquifer. The water table of this aquifer increases because some part
of rain - the one that is not collected for irrigation purposes - soaks into the soil at rate
of infiltration ρ ∈ (0, 1). We denote R the quantity of rain. In line with the wider part of
literature,4 the natural recharge is exogenously determined (i.e. not stock dependent).5
Conversely, the water table decreases because farmers withdraw water from the ground.
Farmer i pumps a quantity of groundwater wgi(t) from the aquifer at time t and there-
fore the decline of the level of water table results from the total pumping :
∑N
i=1wgi(t).
He can also directly collect a quantity wri(t) from the recharge at the surface, before
rainwater seeps into the ground. Consequently, rainwater harvesting reduces the amount
of water that replenishes the aquifer by the total quantity of rainwater that resource users
have harvested, that is
∑N
i=1wri(t). This quantity cannot exceed the quantity of rain, i.e.∑N
i=1wri(t) ≤ R. When the farmers collect rainwater, the quantity of water that reaches
the aquifer is ρ
(
R−
∑N
i=1wri(t)
)
.
Combining these assumptions all together, we assume that the groundwater dynamics
is characterized by the following differential equation:
ḣ = ρ
(
R−
N∑
i=1
wri(t)
)
−
N∑
i=1
wgi(t), (1)
where h (t) is the level of the water table at time t.
This simple formulation allows us to account for the connection between the two water
supplies and emphasizes the hydrological aspect.
4See, among others, Gisser and Sanchez [6], Koundouri [10], Rubio and Casino [22].
5For simplification, we do not take into account the local percolation and discharge. When the
water table is near the ground surface, there is little opportunity for recharge and shallow aquifers are
recharged by local percolation of surface water and discharged by crops that use the water out of the
ground. However, large aquifers run deep and are highly dependent on rain and melting snow.
5
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2.2 Farmers’ Net Benefits
Farmers use a combination of the two water supplies, wgi(t) ≥ 0 and wri(t) ≥ 0 at period
t, for production.6 The two water supplies have heterogeneous productive properties, thus
they impact the output differently. Namely, the productivity of groundwater is denoted
µ > 0 and the productivity of rainwater is denoted θ > 0. We assume that the two water
supplies are substitutes:
wi = µwgi + θwri. (2)
The effective quantity of water, wi, is the unique input and F (.) is an increasing and
concave production function. The price of one unit of output is normalized to 1, thus
F (wi)) represents farmer i’s instantaneous benefit. The cost of extraction of groundwater,
Cg(., .), is a function of the water table level, h, and of the individual pumping rate, wg.
7
This cost increases with the quantity of groundwater extraction and decreases with the
water table level:
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi) ≥ 0,
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi) ≤ 0. (3)
The cost of rainwater harvesting, Cr (wri), (e.g the transport cost from the point
of the reservoir to the irrigation area) depends on the quantity collected and does not
depend on the level of the water table. This cost is increasing, C ′r > 0. We make usual
assumptions on the convexity of the cost functions, ∂
2Cg
∂w2g
(h,wgi) ≥ 0, ∂
2Cg
∂h2
(h,wgi) ≥ 0,
and C ′′r (wri) ≥ 0. We also assume that the cross-derivative of the cost of groundwater
extraction is negative, ∂
2Cg
∂h∂wg
(h,wgi) < 0, i.e. the marginal cost of groundwater extraction
decreases when the level of the water table increases.
The combination of all these observations leads to define farmer i’s net benefit at time
t as follows:
F (µwgi(t) + θwri(t))− Cg(h(t), wgi(t))− Cr (wri(t)) . (4)
The farmers behave non-cooperatively. They maximize the present value of their stream
of profits given the extraction path of others with a common discount rate δ. The ith
farmer faces the following dynamic optimization problem:
6As we focus on irrigation strategies, water is the only input considered.
7We consider a “bathtub” type aquifer, and then the cost is the same at each point of the aquifer.
6
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max
{wgi,wri}
∫ ∞
0
(F (wi(t))− Cg(h(t), wgi(t))− Cr (wri(t))) exp−δt dt
w.r.t
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
ḣ = ρ
(
R−
∑N
i wri(t)
)
−
∑N
i wgi(t)
wgi(t) ≥ 0
wri(t) ≥ 0
h(t) ≥ 0
R ≥
∑N
i wri(t)
h(0) given and h(∞) free
(5)
In the next section, we will focus on the stationary feedback Nash equilibria of this
differential game.
3 Stationary Feedback Nash Equilibria
The farmers solve their dynamic problem simultaneously. We focus on the Stationary
(feedback) Nash Equilibria (SNE). In other words, assuming that players use Markovian
strategies, we have wrj(t) = φrj (h (t)) and wgj(t) = φgj (h (t)) for all j, and we can define
the current-value Hamiltonian function of farmer i as follows:8
Hi = F (wi)−Cg(h,wgi)−Cr (wri) + pi
[
ρ
(
R− wri −
∑
j 6=i
φrj (h)
)
− wgi −
∑
j 6=i
φgj (h)
]
,
(6)
where pi is the shadow price of groundwater for farmer i.
We consider cases where the aquifer is not fully exhausted, h(t) > 0. We also focus
on the most interesting cases in which some farmers pump groundwater at the SNE.
This means that some strictly positive quantity of rain has to soak into the soil, i.e.∑N
i=1wri(t) < R. The Lagrangian function of farmer i is then:
Li = Hi + λgiwgi + λriwri, (7)
8We remove the argument t to relieve the expressions.
7
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where λgi and λri are the Lagrangian multipliers.
The first order conditions for farmer i are:
∂Li
∂wgi
= µF ′ (wi)−
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− pi + λgi = 0, (8)
λgi ≥ 0, λgiwgi = 0, (9)
∂Li
∂wri
= θF ′ (wi)− C ′r (wri)− ρpi + λri = 0, (10)
λri ≥ 0, λriwri = 0, (11)
ṗi = δi (h) pi −
∂Li
∂h
= δi (h) pi +
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi), (12)
ḣ = ρR− (ρwri + wgi)−
∑
j 6=i
[ρφrj (h) + φgj (h)] , (13)
where wi = µwgi + θwri and, δi (h) is such that
δi (h) = δ +
∑
j 6=i
(
ρ
∂φrj
∂h
+
∂φgj
∂h
)
. (14)
Condition (8) states that the marginal benefit of one additional unit of groundwater
must be equal to the total marginal cost (that is the sum of costs, extraction or storage,
with the opportunity cost of removing one unit of water from the ground), if the farmers
indeed use groundwater. Condition (10) states that the marginal benefit of one additional
unit of rainwater must be equal to the total marginal cost (that is the sum of costs,
extraction or storage, with the opportunity cost of removing one unit of water from
the ground), if the farmers indeed use rainwater. Condition (12) characterizes the time
variation of shadow price of player i, pi. This condition characterizes the effect of a
decrease of the water table level (in the current period) on future profits. It is positively
affected by the effective discount rate, the current price and the marginal effect of the
water table depletion on pumping cost. Conditions (9) and (11) are the complementary
slackness conditions. Condition (14) defines the effective discount rate, which is the rate
at which agent i discounts the future value of the resource. It is composed with the sum of
the discount rate, δ, and an additional term,
∑
j 6=i
(
ρ
∂φrj
∂h
+
∂φgj
∂h
)
. The intuition behind this
additional term is that, when farmers use feedback strategies, they take into account the
8
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fact that their current use of water will affect other farmers’ future use of water (through
a change in the height of the watertable). This can be interpreted as a change of the
discount rate used in the dynamics of the farmer’s shadow price.9
In the following, the marginal costs of groundwater and rainwater play an important
role in the optimal choice of the farmers. The marginal costs of groundwater and rainwater
are essentially different because the short run marginal cost of groundwater, ∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi),
depends on the level of the water table h while the short run marginal cost of rainwater,
C ′r (wri), does not. In a SNE, the shadow price of groundwater becomes constant and is
given by pi = − 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi). It is the marginal effect of a decrease in the water table
weighted by the effective discount rate δi (h) (see condition (12) with ṗi = 0). It represents
the increase in the future marginal costs of groundwater use due to contemporaneous use of
groundwater. The user cost of rainwater, ρpi, is a fraction of the user cost of groundwater,
because the recharge rate of the aquifer from rainwater is ρ < 1. It represents the increase
in the future marginal costs of groundwater use due to contemporaneous use of rainwater.
Let us define the marginal cost of groundwater of farmer i. It is the sum of the marginal
extraction cost, ∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi), and the user cost of groundwater, pi = − 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi):
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)−
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi), (15)
Similarly, we define the marginal cost of rainwater of farmer i It is the sum of the marginal
harvesting cost C ′r (wri) and the user cost of rainwater, ρpi = −ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi):
C ′r (wri)− ρ
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi). (16)
Let us also define the ratio of marginal costs as the ratio of the marginal cost of ground-
9Assume that the other farmers increase their use of groundwater and rainwater when the height of
the watertable increases, i.e.
∑
j 6=i
(
ρ
∂φrj
∂h +
∂φgj
∂h
)
, and pi > 0. Hence, the shadow price of groundwater
for farmer i may be increasing (see necessary condition (12)). In such a situation, farmer i has incentives
to increase its use of groundwater and rainwater.
9
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water and the marginal cost of rainwater:
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
C ′r (wri)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
. (17)
At the SNE, farmers may choose various mixes of groundwater and rainwater. In
particular, they can use groundwater or rainwater only but they can also use both water
sources simultaneously.
3.1 Symmetric and Asymmetric SNE
To characterize the various possible types of SNE, it is convenient to define three different
groups of farmers: (i) ng ≥ 0 farmers are fully specialized in groundwater pumping (group
G), (ii) nr ≥ 0 farmers are fully specialized in rainwater harvesting (group R), and (ii)
nb ≥ 0 farmers use both groundwater and rainwater (group B).
We are going to consider symmetric and asymmetric SNE. Symmetric SNE are such
that all the farmers use the same quantity of rainwater and/or groundwater, i.e. such
that wri = wrj and wgi = wgj for all i and j. Asymmetric equilibria are such at least two
farmers do not use the same quantity of rainwater and/or groundwater, i.e. wri 6= wrj or
wgi 6= wgj. Notice that if at least two groups of farmers (among G, R and B) are non
empty, then the SNE is necessarily asymmetric.
We distinguish the first order conditions for the three groups of farmers. Formally,
the optimal choice of a farmer who uses groundwater only, i.e. wri = 0 and wgi > 0 with
i ∈ G, is characterized by the following necessary conditions (with the slackness condition,
λgi = 0), for all i ∈ G,
µF ′(µwgi)−
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− pi = 0, (18)
θF ′(µwgi)− C ′r (0)− ρpi(t) + λri = 0, (19)
ṗi = 0 = δi (h) pi +
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi). (20)
A farmer who uses rainwater only, i.e. wri > 0 and wgi = 0 with i ∈ R, is characterized
10
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by the following necessary conditions (with the slackness condition, λri = 0), for all i ∈ R,
µF ′(θwri)−
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, 0)− pi + λgi = 0, (21)
θF ′(θwri)− C ′r (wri)− ρpi = 0, (22)
ṗi = 0 = δi (h) pi +
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0), (23)
The choice of a farmer who uses both rainwater and groundwater, i.e. wri > 0 and
wgi > 0 with i ∈ B, is characterized by the following necessary conditions (with the two
slackness conditions, λri = λgi = 0), for all i ∈ B,
µF ′(µwgi + θwri)−
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− pi = 0, (24)
θF ′(µwgi + θwri)− C ′r (wri)− ρpi = 0, (25)
ṗi = 0⇔ δi (h) pi +
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi) = 0, (26)
Finally, the water table dynamics is affected by the resource use of all the farmers. At
any stationary equilibrium, using (13), we have:
ḣ = 0⇔ ρR−
∑
i∈R
ρwri −
∑
i∈G
wgi −
∑
i∈B
(ρwri + wgi) = 0. (27)
3.2 Productivity and Irrigation Strategies
Let us further analyze the necessary conditions for each group of farmer.
Let us consider a farmer i of group G (the farmers who use groundwater only). Using
equations (18) and (20), we find that the marginal benefit of groundwater must be equal
to the marginal cost of groundwater:
µF ′(µwgi) =
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)−
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi), (28)
and using condition (19) and λri ≥ 0, we find that the marginal cost of rainwater must
11
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be larger than the marginal benefit of rainwater:
C ′r (0)− ρ
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi) ≥ θF ′(µwgi). (29)
Using (28) and (29), we obtain the following necessary condition for the choice of the
group who uses groundwater only (for i ∈ G):
µ
θ
≥
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
C ′r (0)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
. (30)
Condition (30) states that, for any farmer who uses groundwater only, the relative marginal
productivity of groundwater is larger than the ratio of marginal costs.
Let us consider a farmer who uses rainwater only (i ∈ R). Using (22) and (23), we
find that the marginal benefit of rainwater must equal its marginal cost:
θF ′(θwri) = C
′
r (wri)− ρ
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0), (31)
and using (21), (23), and λgi ≥ 0, we find that the marginal cost of groundwater must be
greater than or equal to its marginal benefit:
µF ′(θwri) ≤
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, 0)− 1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0). (32)
Using conditions (31) and (32), we obtain a necessary condition for the choice of the group
who uses rainwater only (for i ∈ R):
µ
θ
≤
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, 0)− 1
δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0)
C ′r (wri)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0)
. (33)
Condition (33) states that, for any farmer who uses rainwater only, the productivity ratio
has to be smaller than the ratio of marginal costs.
Let us now consider a farmer who uses both groundwater and rainwater (i ∈ B). Using
12
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conditions (24), (25) and (26), we obtain the following necessary condition (for i ∈ B):
µ
θ
=
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
C ′r (wri)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
. (34)
Condition (34) states that the farmers of group B must be indifferent between using
rainwater or groundwater: the relative productivity must be equal to the ratio of the
marginal costs.
We distinguish three types of SNE in which some farmers may be specialized and other
not. The following proposition provides a necessary condition for the existence of a SNE
in which all the farmers are specialized:
Proposition 1 (Specialized) In a SNE with specialized farmers, no farmer use both
rainwater and groundwater (nb = 0), some farmers use groundwater only (ng ≥ 0) and
some farmers use rainwater only (nr ≥ 0). A necessary condition for such an SNE is:
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
C ′r (0)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
≤ µ
θ
≤
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, 0)− 1
δj(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0)
C ′r (wrj)− ρ 1δj(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0)
, (35)
for all i ∈ G and all j ∈ R.
Proposition 1 states that, a SNE in which all the farmers are specialized exists only
if the productivity ratio is larger that the ratio of the marginal costs of farmers who
use groundwater only and smaller than the ratio of the marginal costs of farmers who
use rainwater only. This is possible for two reasons. First, since farmers use feedback
strategies, two farmers i and j may have different effective discount rates, δi (h) and
δj (h). Hence, their ratios of marginal costs may be two different functions. Second, the
ratio of the marginal costs of a farmer is decreasing in wr and may also be decreasing in
wg.
10 Hence, even if the marginal cost functions of all the farmers are identical, a SNE
with specialized farmers may still exist.
The second type of SNE is such that farmers are not specialized, i.e. they use ground-
water and rainwater. The following proposition provides a necessary condition for the
existence of such a SNE:
10See the proof of Proposition 4.
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Proposition 2 (Non Specialized) In a SNE with non specialized farmers, all the farm-
ers use both rainwater and groundwater (nb > 0 and ng = nr = 0). A necessary condition
for such a SNE is:
µ
θ
=
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
C ′r (wri)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
, ∀i. (36)
Proposition 2 states that, a SNE in which all the farmers use both groundwater and
rainwater exists only if the productivity ratio equals the ratio of the marginal costs of
each farmer.
Proposition 3 (Mixed) In a SNE with non specialized and specialized farmers, some
farmers use both rainwater and groundwater (nb > 0) and some farmers use rainwater
only or groundwater only (nr > 0 and/or ng > 0). A necessary condition for such an
SNE is:
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)− 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
C ′r (0)− ρ 1δi(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi)
≤ µ
θ
=
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgk)− 1δk(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgk)
C ′r (wrk)− ρ 1δk(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgk)
≤
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, 0)− 1
δj(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0)
C ′r (wrj)− ρ 1δj(h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h, 0)
, (37)
for all i ∈ G, all k ∈ B and all j ∈ R.
Proposition 3 states that a SNE in which some farmers are specialized while others are
not exists only if the productivity ratio is larger that the ratio of the marginal costs of the
farmers who use groundwater only, equals the ratio of the marginal costs of the farmers
who use both groundwater and rainwater, and is smaller than the ratio of the marginal
costs of the farmers who use rainwater only. This is possible because two farmers may
have different ratios of marginal cost and also because the marginal cost function of a
farmer is decreasing in wr and may be decreasing and increasing in wg.
In the following, we will focus on the symmetric SNE in which farmers are not spe-
cialized (the most commonly studied) and the asymmetric SNE in which farmers are
specialized (the other polar case).
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4 Tax/Subsidy on Rainwater Use
In this section, we investigate the impact of water pricing policies on the use of ground-
water and rainwater. Water pricing is used in order to render resource use more efficient
and to allocate resources among different uses.
When there is only one resource, one could imagine a tax on water use, in order to keep
more water in rivers and protect associated aquatic ecosystems. However, when substitute
resources exist, one may want to subsidize rainwater use in order to save groundwater,
which may in turn increase the level of the aquifer.
Our model can provide some insight on the effect of such a policy. To do so, we compare
the effect of a change in the cost of rainwater use at two different SNE: an asymmetric
SNE with specialized farmers who either use groundwater (wAg ) or rainwater (w
A
r ) (not
both), and a symmetric SNE with non specialized farmers who use both groundwater and
rainwater (wSg and w
S
r ). Let h
A be the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric SNE, and
hS the level of the aquifer at the symmetric SNE.
Let σ be the tax level such that the cost of rainwater is (1 + σ)Cr (wr). If σ > 0, it is
a tax and, if σ < 0, it is a subsidy. A decrease in σ can be interpreted as an increase in
the subsidy level or as a decrease in the tax on rainwater use.
To asses the effect of a change in the policy (a change in σ), we consider a simple
linear-quadratic specification of our general model with two farmers. Let us assume that
the production function of each farmer is given by F (wi) = wi − 12 (wi)
2, that the cost
functions are such that Cg (h,wg) = (c− h)wg with c > 0 and Cr (wr) = Kwr. To avoid
unrealistic cases in which the net benefit is always decreasing in the amount of rainwater
used, we assume that θ > K, i.e. the marginal contribution of rainwater in the production
process must be higher than its marginal cost.
We first show that, when farmers are specialized (one farmer uses rainwater only and
the other one uses groundwater only), a subsidy on rainwater use (to be precise, a decrease
in σ) has the following effect:11
11In the appendix, we show that the two first statements (a decrease in the cost of rainwater use
increases rainwater use and decreases groundwater use) can be extended to the case of the general model.
The third statement can be generalized to the case of the general model if ng = 1. See the proof of
Proposition 4 in Appendix.
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Proposition 4 At the asymmetric SNE with specialized farmers, the introduction of a
subsidy on rainwater use (a decrease in σ), increases rainwater use, decreases groundwater
use, and decreases the level of the aquifer. Conversely, the introduction of a tax on
rainwater use (an increase in σ), decreases rainwater use, increases groundwater use, and
increases the level of the aquifer. Formally,
∂wAr
∂σ
< 0 <
∂wAg
∂σ
and
∂hA
∂σ
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
At the asymmetric SNE with specialized farmers, an increase in the subsidy on rain-
water (which is equivalent to a decrease in its cost) increases the use of rainwater (for the
farmer who uses rainwater only) and decreases the use of groundwater (for the farmer who
uses groundwater only). This is consistent with an increase in the cost of groundwater
and to a decrease in the level of the aquifer.
Let us now consider the case of non specialized farmers (the two farmers use ground-
water and rainwater):
Proposition 5 : At the symmetric SNE with non specialized farmers, the introduction of
a subsidy on rainwater use (a decrease in σ), decreases rainwater use, increases ground-
water use, and increases the level of the aquifer. Conversely, the introduction of a tax on
rainwater use (an increase in σ), increases rainwater use, decreases groundwater use, and
decreases the level of the aquifer. Formally,
∂wSg
∂σ
< 0 <
∂wSr
∂σ
and
∂hS
∂σ
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof is relegated to the Appendix.
This result is very different from the one in Proposition 4. Non specialized farmers may
react very differently to an increase in the subsidy on rainwater compared to specialized
farmers. At the symmetric equilibrium with non specialized farmers, an increase in the
subsidy on rainwater use may decrease the use of rainwater. When the farmers are
not specialized, they use the two water sources (they “consume” the two “goods”), and
rainwater may act like a Giffen good. Differently, when the farmers are specialized, they
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use only one water source (they “consume” only one “good”), then rainwater cannot act
like a Giffen good.
In the case of non specialized farmers, an increase in the subsidy on rainwater use (a
decrease in the “price” of rainwater), generates a positive substitution effect and an income
effect (it is as if the recharge, R, were larger), which may be negative. When the income
effect is negative and larger than the substitution effect, the farmers use less rainwater and
more groundwater, which is the case in the linear-quadratic specification we considered.
This goes along with a (relative) decrease in the cost of groundwater and with an increase
in the level of the aquifer. In the case of specialized farmers (Proposition 4), since the
farmers use rainwater only (they prefer to “consume” rainwater only), the income effect
cannot be negative. As a result, at the asymmetric equilibrium with specialized farmers,
an increase in the subsidy on rainwater use always increases the use of rainwater.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we deal with the interactions between identical farmers who can choose
between two water supplies (groundwater or rainwater). We characterize stationary sym-
metric and asymmetric equilibria and show that a subsidy on the use of rainwater may
increase the use of rainwater and decrease the use of groundwater at the asymmetric equi-
librium, whereas it may decrease the use of rainwater and increase the use of groundwater
at the symmetric equilibrium. Moreover, the subsidy may increase the level of the aquifer
at the symmetric equilibrium and decrease the level of the aquifer at the asymmetric
equilibrium. Our results suggest that policies have to be designed in order to take into
account how farmers coordinate as regards groundwater and rainwater use.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
We first show a preliminary result. Since we focus on asymmetric equilibria with special-
ized farmers, we have ng ≥ 1, nr ≥ 1 and nb = 0.
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Lemma 1: Assume that wAr , the solution of maxwr [F (θwr)− Cr(wr)], is positive and
let R̄ ≡ R− nrwAr > 0. Also, assume that
V̄gi(h0) = max
wgi≥0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [F (µwgi)− Cg(h,wgi)] dt for all i ∈ G,
ḣ = ρR̄−
∑
i∈G
wgi, h(0) = h0 given,
has a solution such that wAgi(t) > 0 for all i ∈ G and h(t) > 0 for all t. Then, wri = wAr
for all i ∈ R and wgi = wAgi for all i ∈ G is a feedback equilibrium of our differential
game.
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose that a feedback equilibrium with ng ≥ 1, nr ≥ 1, nb = 0
and h(t) > 0 exists. Let Vgi be the value function of player i in group G and Vri the
value function of player i in group R. Let φgi be the feedback equilibrium strategy of
groundwater use for player i in group G and φri be the feedback equilibrium strategy i in
group R. These value functions are a solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equations:
δVgi(h) = max
wg≥0
[
F (µwg)− Cg(h,wg) +
∂Vg(h)
∂h
(
ρ(R−
∑
j∈R
φgj(h))− wg −
∑
j 6=i
φgj(h)
)]
,
(38)
and,
δVri(h) = max
wr≥0
[
F (θwr)− Cr(wr) +
∂V ir (h)
∂h
(
ρ(R− wr −
∑
j 6=i
φjr(h))−
∑
i
φig(h)
)]
.
(39)
Now, let us define the following strategies. Let φr = argmaxwg [F (θwg)− Cr(wg)].
We have
max
wg
[F (θwg)− Cr(wg)] = F (θφr)− Cr(φr),
and
V̄r =
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [F (θφr)− Cr(φr)] dt =
F (θφr)− Cr(φr)
δ
, (40)
and R̄ = R − nrφr. Notice that φr is a constant and it does not depend on h. Also, V̄r
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does not depend on h.
Let φig be the feedback Nash equilibrium strategy of player i of the following differential
game:
V̄gi(h0) = max
wgi≥0
∫ ∞
0
e−δt [F (µwgi)− Cg(h,wgi)] dt, ḣ = ρR̄−
∑
j∈G
wgj, h(0) = h0 given.
The associated HJB equation is
δV̄gi(h) = max
wgi≥0
[
F (µwgi)− Cg(h,wgi) +
∂V̄ ig (h)
∂h
(
ρR̄− wgi −
∑
j 6=i
φjg(h)
)]
. (41)
Suppose that the feedback Nash equilibrium is such that h(t) > 0. Hence V̄gi(h) and V̄g
(with the respective equilibrium strategies) are solutions of (38) and (39).
Now, we can establish the following result:
Lemma 2: There exists an asymmetric SNE with specialized farmers where an increase
in the cost of rainwater (through an increase in σ) has the following effect:
∂wAr
∂σ
< 0 <
∂
(∑
i∈Gw
A
gi
)
∂σ
Moreover, we have ∂h
A
∂σ
> 0 when ng = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Let Cr ≡ (1 + σ) C̃r. Using Lemma 1, we have wAr = maxwr
[
F (θwr)− (1 + σ) C̃r(wr)
]
and R̄ ≡ R−nrwAr . Hence, when σ increases, wAr decreases and R̄ increases. At the steady
state,
∑
i∈G φGi =
∑
i∈Gw
A
gi = ρR̄, and then
∑
i∈Gw
A
gi increases with σ. If all the players
in group G use the same level of groundwater, then wAgi increases with σ.
Now, let us focus on the case in which ng = 1. Since w
A
r does not depend on h, we
have δi (h) = δ for i ∈ G. Let us show that ∂h
A
∂σ
> 0. We first show that µ
θ
> 1
ρ
. Let
RCi ≡MCgi(h,wgi)/MCri (h,wgi, wri) denote the ratio of marginal costs, where
MCgi(h,wgi) ≡
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wgi)−
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi), (42)
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and,
MCri (h,wgi, wri) ≡ C ′r (wri)− ρ
1
δi (h)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wgi). (43)
Let wAg ≡ wAgi. Using condition (30), condition (33) and because the ratio of
the marginal costs is a decreasing function of wri, we have
MCg(h,w
A
g )
MCr(h,wAg , 0)
≤ µ
θ
<
MCg(h, 0)
MCr(h, 0, 0)
. (44)
Note that this implies that it is not possible MCg(h,wg)
MCr(h,wg ,0)
≥ 0 for all wg ∈ [0, wAg ] (because
if it is the case wAg < 0). Then there must exist w̃g ∈ [0, wAg ] such that the derivative of
the ratio of marginal cost, MCg(h,w̃g)
MCr(h,w̃g ,0)
is negative. Notice that this derivative is:
 [∂2Cg∂w2g (h, w̃g)− 1δ ∂2Cg∂wg∂h(h, w̃g)] [C ′r (0)− ρ1δ ∂Cg∂h (h, w̃g)]
+ρ1
δ
∂2Cg
∂wg∂h
(h, g̃)
[
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, w̃g)− 1δ
∂Cg
∂h
(h, w̃g)
] 
[
C ′r (0)− ρ1δ∂hCg(h, w̃g)
]2
=
∂2Cg
∂w2g
(h, w̃g)
[
C ′r (0)− ρ1δ
∂Cg
∂h
(h, w̃g)
]
− 1
δ
∂2Cg
∂wg∂h
(h, w̃g)
[
C ′r (0)− ρ
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, w̃g)
]
[
C ′r (0)− ρ1δ
∂Cg
∂h
(h, w̃g)
]2 .
Hence, we must have
C ′r (0)− ρ
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, w̃g) < −
∂2Cg
∂w2g
(h, w̃g)
−1
δ
∂2Cg
∂wg∂h
(h, w̃g)
[
C ′r (0)− ρ
1
δ
∂Cg
∂h
(h, w̃g)
]
< 0. (45)
Using (45) and ∂
2Cg
∂w2g
≥ 0, we have
1
ρ
C ′r(0)−
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wAg ) <
1
ρ
C ′r(0)−
∂Cg
∂wg
(h, w̃g) < 0.
This implies
MCg(h,w
A
g )
MCr(h,wAg , 0)
=
1
ρ
Cg(h,w
A
g )− (1/δ)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wAg )
C ′r(0)/ρ− (1/δ)
∂Cg
∂h
(h,wAg )
>
1
ρ
,
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Using (44), we have µ
θ
> 1
ρ
.
Differentiating (28) with respect to σ, we have[
1
δ
∂2Cg
∂h2
(h,wAg )−
∂2Cg
∂wg∂h
(h,wAg )
]
∂h
∂σ
=
[
∂Cg
∂wg
(h,wAg )−
1
δ
∂2Cg
∂wg∂h
(h,wAg )− µ2F ′′(µwAg )
]
∂wAg
∂σ
Finally, ∂h
A
∂σ
> 0.
Moreover, in the quadratic linear specification with two players, the SNE with spe-
cialized farmers is unique.
Proof of Proposition 5
We focus on the SNE in which the two farmers use rainwater and groundwater. Assuming
that the two farmers use linear strategies, i.e. that farmer i considers that player j uses
wgj = agh + bg and wrj = arh + br and that the value function is quadratic V (h) =
A
2
h2 +Bh+ C. The farmer has to solve the following problem:
δV (h) = max
wr,wg
[
F (µwg + θwr)− (c− h)wg −Kwr +
∂V (h)
∂h
(ρ(R− wr − arh− br)− wg − agh− bg)
]
.
For this case, first order condition gives:
µ− (µwg + θwr)µ− c+ h− Ah−B = 0, θ − (µwg + θwr)θ −K − (Ah+B)ρ = 0,
from these two equations we obtain
µ
θ
=
c− h+ Ah+B
K + (Ah+B)ρ
. (46)
This states that the solution is singular solution because h does not depend on time.12
Hence, in equilibrium, we must have A = B = 0 and ḣ = 0. The unique steady state is
12Also note that the optimal levels of h,wg, wr are constant. If h0 = h the optimal solution is to keep
ḣ (t) = 0, for all t. If this is not the case, it remains to study the transitory path.
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characterized by:
hS = c− µ
θ
K, wSg =
ρ
(
θ −K − θ2R
2
)
θ(ρµ− θ)
, wSr =
−θ +K + θµρR
2
θ(ρµ− θ)
.
We can easily deduce that
∂hS
∂σ
=
∂hS
∂K
< 0,
and
∂wSr
∂σ
=
∂wSr
∂K
= −1
ρ
∂wSg
∂K
.
Moreover
wSg = ρ
µ+ h− c− θµR
2
µ(ρµ− θ)
, wSr =
−µ+ c− h+ µ2ρR
2
µ(ρµ− θ)
,
with
∂wSg
∂h
=
1
µ(ρµ− θ)
,
∂wSr
∂h
= − 1
µ(ρµ− θ)
.
One can check that wSg , w
S
r > 0 implies ρµ − θ > 0. Hence
∂wSg
∂σ
=
∂wSg
∂h
∂hS
∂σ
< 0 and
∂wSr
∂σ
= ∂w
S
r
∂h
∂hS
∂σ
> 0.
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